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1  INTRODUCTION
The overwhelming majority of banks currently use the so called  „percentage of notional“
and „Current Exposure + Add On’’ formulas for the measurement of credit risk in their
derivatives portfolios. However, these approaches do not deliver exposure figures that
adequately describe the counterparty risk of a specific counterparty, because they rely on
a variety of simplifying assumptions that may lead to gross over- or underestimations of
the true counterparty risk. In particular, it is unable to take account for portfolio effects
since it is based on single transaction analysis.
Many German banks currently are still struggling to comply with the „Current Exposure
+ Add On’’ approach required by the regulators.
1 At the same time, regulatory
authorities increasingly require banks to apply sophisticated exposure measurement
systems. The „Risk Management Guidelines on Derivatives“ by the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) explicitly state that the „Current Exposure + Add On’’ is
only acceptable for small end users of derivatives while Dealers and large derivatives
participants should assess potential exposure through simulation analysis.
2 Also the
Group of Thirty recommends the use of simulation analysis in order to derive meaningful
exposure figures on portfolios of derivative transactions.
3 According to the US
Comptroller of the Currency, the development of a methodology for calculating a
reasonable proxy for potential credit exposure is a key element for effective credit risk
management. This proxy should be statistically derived from relevant market factors.
4
The German  „Mindestanforderungen für den Eigenhandel“ define the „Current Exposure
+ Add On’’ approach as a minimum standard for all banks. However, they also state that
the risk controlling systems used by banks must be appropriate given the complexity and
                                               
1 Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen (1996), S. 6.
2 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, July 1994, p. 13.
3 Derivatives Practices and Principles, Section 2 (Credit Risk), July 1993, p. 22ff.
4 Comptroller’s Handbook (1994), p. 20, 25.First Draft
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volume of a banks trading business. It is therefore expected that future interpretations of
this guideline will be such that a bank with large swap trading volume will be required to
replace its old system by new methods consistent with the BIS or the Group of 30
recommendations.
In the past, credit risks of derivatives transactions in the over the counter (OTC) market
have received little importance because of the generally good credit quality of market
participants. However, a study of the Federal Reserve Bank revealed, that the credit
quality of OTC market participants has declined dramatically over the last years. Besides
this, some large losses due to counterparty defaults suffered by banks have made it clear
that  credit risks of derivatives transactions are significant and must be managed.
2  THE NATURE OF CREDIT EXPOSURE FROM DERIVATIVES
The exposure from derivatives transactions is very different and much more complicated
as compared to the exposure from the credit business. When a bank counterparty
defaults only minutes after the confirmation of a OTC derivative transaction, losses are
minimal because the bank can replace the transaction with another transaction at
approximately the same market rates. When default occurs at a later point of time
however, the bank may loose a lot of money in the event of counterparty default if
market rates in the meanwhile have changed such that the replacement cost of the
transaction has become positive. Suppose the transaction is a simple fx-forward where
the bank is buying 100 million $ at 1.50. At maturity, this contract is worth 100 million
times the difference of the then prevailing dollar rate and the contract price of 1.50.
When the spot market exchange rate at maturity is below 1.50, there is no exposure at
all. With a dollar exchange rate of 1.80, a default of the counterparty costs the bank 30
million USD. If the dollar should jump to 3 DM, the loss to the bank could however be
as high as 100 million $. Credit exposure is therefore similar to an option on the contract
value as shown in the following chart:First Draft
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Obviously, the nature of exposure in the derivatives area is very different from exposure
in the credit area. While a credit manager can safely state: „when the counterparty goes
bust, we loose (at most) X DM“, the derivatives manager can only make probabilistic
statements of the sort: „If the counterparty defaults in December 1999, the probability
that we loose more than X DM is approximately y%“. The size of exposure is not even
limited: since there is no bound to possible rises of the dollar, the exposure may also
grow without bounds. Additionally, the credit exposure of derivatives is a function of
time: as more time passes, the possible exchange rate changes increase and thus the
exposure increases. This phenomenon can be reflected by exposure profiles, which
measure the exposure for a given probability y as a function of time. The following chart
shows a possible exposure profile for the above Fx-forward.First Draft
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Time T
In the example of an fx-forward, the exposure is an increasing function of time until
contract maturity (T), since the volatility of the dollar increases when the time horizon is
lengthened. For other derivatives such as interest rate swaps, the profile is generally first
increases and later decreases. The reason is that there are two offsetting effects at work:
On the one hand, interest rate volatility increases over time as in the case for the fx-
forward. On the other hand, the passage of time leads to fewer payments outstanding
which has an exposure reducing effect.
Exposure profiles contain a lot of information which is hard to compare and appreciate.
Banks and regulators therefore condense this information in two numbers: the expected
exposure and the worst case exposure. Expected exposure is defined as the maximum of
the exposure profile when the probability y=0,5 is chosen. The worst exposure
equivalently defines the maximum exposure over time for a confidence level of 95%.
3  THE IMPACT OF PORTFOLIO EFFECTS ON DERIVATIVES
EXPOSURE
Traditional exposure measurement techniques neglect portfolio aspects by measuring
exposure on a single transaction basis. A large body of literature investigates theFirst Draft
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derivation of  worst case exposures for isolated transactions.
5 When exposure of a
portfolio of transactions is to be evaluated, the risk controller has to evaluate the
probability that the exposure from a portfolio of transactions exceeds some level. In this
case, both diversification and offsetting effects have an impact on portfolio exposure.
When the above USD-Forward example is changed by adding another long USD-
Forward, the worst movement of the USD is still an increase of the Dollar. If however a
short Forward is added to the portfolio, the worst case exposure may be defined either
by an increase or decrease of the Dollar, depending on notional value and maturity of
both transactions. Even worse, we generally cannot specify in advance, at which point of
time the portfolio reaches its peak exposure. While a single Fx-Forward transaction
always reaches its maximum potential exposure at maturity, the worst potential exposure
on portfolios may happen at any point of time. This is because the exposure reducing
effect of the roll-off of maturing transactions may at some point of time offset the effect
of increasing volatility of the underlying market rates. This implies that a search for the
worst case exposure must include all points of time between now and the maturity of the
last transaction.
Regulators are concerned with portfolio exposure mainly in respect to the impact of
netting agreements. Under a close out netting agreement, the bank may net transactions
with positive and negative present value in the case of counterparty default and thus
incurs a reduced loss potential. Because regulators want to promote the use of netting
agreements by reducing the required equity cushion, the Bank for International
Settlements 1994 proposed to use the netted current replacement value instead of the
gross replacement value, when a qualifying netting agreement is in place.
6
However, it is important to recognize that portfolio effects have an impact on exposure
figures irrespective of the fact whether a netting agreement is in place or not. As an
illustration, consider the following example of a portfolio that consists of a long term
receiving swap with high notional value and a smaller sized short term paying swap. The
exposure profile of Swap 1 is thus based on maximum possible interest rate decrease
                                               
5 See for example Cooper (1991), Duffee (1994), Hull (1989), Hull and White (1991), Wall and Fung (1987).
6 Siehe Heldring (1995).First Draft
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because this will result in a positive replacement cost. The reverse is true for Swap 2. A
typical exposure profile for both transactions and the portfolio is depicted in the
following chart:
Potential exposure Swap 1 Potential exposure swap 2
t t
t
t
+
=
Portfolio exposure
without netting
Portfolio exposure with netting
Total exposure identical to swap 1 exposure  Total exposure = Swap 1 exposure - spap 2 expsoure
Offsettings affect portfolio exposure with and without netting
t
Simple sum of exposures
When aggregating the exposures without a netting agreement, the short term swap
effectively has a zero exposure contribution because its exposure is always more than
offset by Swap 1. (The „worst case“ exposure of the portfolio happens when interest
rates move down. In that case, Swap 2 has zero exposure.) When a netting agreement is
in place, the offsetting nature of both swaps reduces credit exposure as long as both
swaps are not matured. Comparing the portfolio exposures to the simple sum of
exposures, is obvious that portfolio effects are important both with and without netting.
It is clear that traditional Add On measures based on isolated transaction characteristics
can by no means incorporate the portfolio effects that determine aggregate portfolio
exposure. When Add On’s correctly measure the worst potential exposure of a single
transaction and portfolio exposure is simply calculated as the sum of individualFirst Draft
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exposures (as depicted in the „simple sum of exposures“ chart above), the resulting
portfolio exposure will in general be grossly overstated. This is because the method in
our example implicitly assumes that interest rates can move up and down simultaneously.
In order to prevent this exaggeration, it is a common procedure to implicitly assume
some „normal“ degree of diversification within the counterparty portfolio in determining
Add On’s. This approach bases exposure calculations on smaller Add On’s than those
that would be required for single transactions. While this approach on average produces
exposure figures that are closer to „true“ exposure figures, it obviously does not make
exposure numbers any more accurate. Since there is no guarantee that offsetting
portfolio effects are indeed working within a specific counterparty portfolio, the
exaggeration is simply replaced by a potential (and severe) underestimation of exposure.
4  THE EVOLUTION OF EXPOSURE MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES
In order to investigate the advantages and shortcomings of different exposure
measurement techniques, we give an overview of the historical evolution of the different
approaches developed by the banking industry. The following chart visualizes the early
stages of this evolution:First Draft
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Evolution of exposure measurement
Percentage of notional based on original
maturity
Current replacement cost + add on based on
remaining maturity
Current exposure + volatility based add on
Portfolio exposure profile from Monte Carlo
simulation
4.1  PERCENTAGE OF NOTIONAL
Lacking adequate concepts and systems, most banks began to measure exposure as a
simple percentage of notional contract value. The percentage factors usually depend on
product type and original maturity class. This method implies that the fx-forward from
the introducing example would have the same exposure irrespective of  the current
exchange rate, i.e. its current replacement cost - an unacceptable simplification. Consider
for example that the Forward of the example matures next month. If the current
exchange rate is still 1.50, the probability of reaching a 100 million $  exposure
(equivalent to an exchange rate of 3.00) is close to zero. Now suppose that the current
exchange rate is 2.90. An exchange rate of 3.00 now becomes a realistic scenario for the
next month.
4.2  CURRENT REPLACEMENT COST PLUS ADD ON
The next step in exposure measurement was the break down of exposure into current
replacement cost and future potential exposure. The logic of this break down is a simpleFirst Draft
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principle from statistics: the largest value that a random number (the exposure) can take
can always be expressed as its mean value plus some multiple of its volatility. One sees
that the „current replacement cost + Add On“ formula replicates this logic if two
assumptions are met:
￿  The current exposure is the „best guess“ for the future exposure, i.e. its
expected value.
￿  The Add On reflects the volatility of possible exposure changes in a
meaningful way.
Assumption one seems innocent but is a critical assumption with questionable empirical
validity. Consider for example a swaption position. If all underlying risk factors follow a
random walk
7, then the expected future rates are today’s rates. The expected future
replacement cost however is not today’s replacement cost because the passage of time
(Theta) additionally affects the value of the swaption.
Assumption 2 implies also a very strong simplification. An Add On which depends on
remaining maturity and product type obviously neglects important other drivers of the
volatility of exposure increases. On the one hand, it neglects the obvious fact that
different currencies etc. have different volatilities. On the other hand, the volatility of
future exposure does not depend on single transaction data besides maturity. For
example, the true interest rate sensitivity of a swap depends on the value of the fixed
coupon rate. Two otherwise equal swaps with different fixed rates will therefore have
different frequency distributions of future exposure but both receive the same Add On.
4.3  CURRENT REPLACEMENT COST PLUS VOLATILITY BASED ADD ON
A large body of research has tried to improve the Add On calculation by deriving
formulas that make Add On’s in a more or less complicated way dependent on the
specific product’s exposure volatility. While these approaches more or less achieved an
accurate derivation of the single transaction future potential exposure, they all
completely failed to take into account portfolio effects:
                                               
7 See section 5 for a formal definition of a random walk process.First Draft
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￿  Offsettings: When there are two exactly offsetting transactions, the worst case
exposure assumed in single transaction based Add On’s cannot happen at the
same time for both transactions.
￿  Diversification: The future exposure depends on the comovement of the
exposures of all transactions with one counterparty. Due to correlation effects,
the probability that all single transaction exposures simultaneously reach their
individual 95% confidence level is much smaller than the 5% probability which
is valid for every single transaction.
￿  The effects of netting arrangements: When close out netting of exposure is
allowed in the case of a counterparty default, the future potential exposure is
reduced by the fact that in the case of default there is a high probability that
negative present value transactions will help to reduce the exposure.
4.4  EXPOSURE PROFILES FROM MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
Since there is no generally applicable analytic way to handle portfolio effects,
simulation techniques are usually employed to analyse potential exposure for portfolios.
In a simulation, exposure is derived by generating very many possible future scenarios of
market rates for different time horizons and by calculating the exposure for every single
scenario. The exposure profile can then be derived by determining the i’th largest
exposure observation for every time horizon, where i is chosen such that 5% (or 50%) of
simulated exposure observations exceed the i’th exposure. Obviously, the quality of a
simulation depends to a large extent on the stochastic model used to generate future
market rate scenarios. A good simulation generates market rate scenarios that closely
match the (unknown) true distribution of market rates.First Draft
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In order to prevent arbitrariness in the selection of scenarios, Monte Carlo techniques are
usually used to generate future market rate scenarios based on random numbers. The
Monte Carlo approach opens a large variety of alternative measures how to derive future
market rate scenarios. The major modelling alternatives are outlined in the next chart:
4.5  RANDOM WALK MODEL
The simple random walk model states that the value of  a market rate one time step
ahead is just its current value plus an additional noise term with expected value of zero
and standard deviation s
e. Noise terms of different periods are i.i.d., i.e. identically and
independently distributed.
S S
t t t + = +
1 e e
t~ N( , ) 0 s
e
Evolution of Monte Carlo Simulation Approaches
Random Walk model without correlation effects
Mutivariate Brownian motion
Recognition of Time dependent volatility  (mean reversion) using
ARMA models
Recognition of time dependent correlation using
vector autogregressive models
Combination of VAR processes and Regression analyticsFirst Draft
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Due to the i.i.d. assumption, the variance of St+n is n*se
2 and its standard deviation is
n*s e, which is the so called „square root of time formula“. Future market rate
scenarios for different time horizons can thus be derived from random numbers from a
standard normal distribution. While the random walk model is capable of acknowledging
varying volatilities of different markets, its major shortcoming is the implicit
independence assumption between market rate changes. The correlation between all
market rates is thus exogenously set to zero.
4.6  MULTIVARIATE BROWNIAN MOTION
The simple random walk model can easily be extended to a multivariate setting which
includes correlation effects, if  it is assumed that market rates follow a multivariate
brownian motion process. In a discrete time setting, the vector of market rates S is
governed by the process:
S S
t t t + = +
1 e et~ N( , ) 0 S
e
where the vector of disturbance terms et  is again assumed to be i.i.d. This model is used
by many banks and software providers for the estimation of derivatives exposure.
8
Different volatilities and correlations among the different market rates are represented in
the covariance matrix S. Due to the i.i.d. assumption, market rate scenarios for any
desired time horizon can again be easily derived from the formula
S S
t n t t n
+ = + e
where n
t e  is distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix nSe. The Cholesky
decomposition technique can now be applied in order to generate random market rate
scenarios for this model. The Cholesky decomposition technique determines a triangular
matrix D with the following property:
S D D
e e e = ¢
T
When a vector of independent standard normal variates x is multiplied with De , the
resulting vector y is distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix Se.
9
                                               
8 See for example Iben and Brotherton-Ratcliffe (1992) and Brock (1995).First Draft
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y x
T = D
The Cholesky decomposition technique thus allows to generate random samples from a
multivariate normal distribution from random numbers of standard normal distribution.
The brownian motion assumption allows to generate market rate scenarios which fit both
the empirically estimated volatlities and correlations of the market rates. However, the
brownian motion model is not a completely satisfactory model of real world market rate
dynamics. One major shortcoming of the brownian motion model is its inability to
recognize mean reversion. Mean reversion describes the tendency of many market rates
(for example interest rates and implied volatilities) to revert to some long run equilibrium
value. According to the brownian motion assumption, the probability of an increase or
decrease of an interest rate does not depend of whether the rate is currently low or at an
all-time high. This implies that the variance of a market rate is still a linear function of
time. However, the mean reverting nature of interest rates make long term volatility
generally lower than the volatility predicted by the brownian motion model. As an
example suppose an interest rate is currently at 10% and has an annual standard
deviation of 20%. According to the brownian motion model, there is a 5% chance that
the interest rate in one year will exceed 10%*(1+1.65*0.2) = 13.3%. Over a 10 year
horizon however, there is a 5% chance for the rate to increase above
10%*(1+1.65*0.2* 10 )= 20,5%. This rate is empirically implausible because of the
mean reverting nature of interest rates.
4.7  INCLUDING MEAN REVERSION
One way to model mean reversion is the inclusion of autoregressive terms in the
underlying stochastic process. Because an unusual large jump in interest rates is unlikely
to be followed by another large jump in the same direction, the innovations produced by
the model must be „history dependent“. A natural way to incorporate this phenomenon
into a Monte Carlo simulation is to use a stochastic processes which is capable of
representing mean reversion such as the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Process (which is the
continuous time equivalent of an autoregressive process of order 1, an  AR(1) process).
                                                                                                                                         
9 For a proof, see for example Hamilton (1994), p. 92.First Draft
15
In a discrete time setting, the Ornstein Uhlenbeck process supposes the following
process for S:
S S a b S
t t t t t + = + - +
1 *( ) e e ~ N( , ) 0 s
e
where b is the long run level to which the process reverts and a is a rate of strength with
which this reversion operates. Note that this process can be rewritten in the form of an
ordinary AR(1) process:
S S
t t t t + = + +
1 a b e e * ~ N( , ) 0 s
e
which can easily be estimated using OLS regression techniques. The one step ahead
volatility of the process is obviously se. In order to derive the volatility of an n step
ahead forecast, we first derive (as an example) an analytical expression for St+3:
[ ]
S S S
S S
S
t t t t t t
t t t t t
t t t t
+ + + +
+ + +
+ +
= + + = + + + +
= + + + + + +
= + + + + + + +
2 1 1 1
3 1 2
2 2 2
1 2 1
a b e a b a b e e
a b a b a b e e e
a b a b a b b e b e e
* *( * )
*( * )
* * * * )
Assuming i.i.d. of the innovations, it can easily been shown that the variance of St+3 is
( ) * 1
2 + + b b s e . In general, the variance of the n step ahead forecast results to be
s b b b s e S
n
t n + = + + + +
2 2 1 ( ... ) * .
As one can see, the long term volatility equals the random walk process volatility for the
limiting case of b=1. For a smaller Beta, the long term volatility becomes smaller than
the volatility generated by the random walk model. The implementation of a Monte Carlo
simulation with long horizon risk factor scenarios using an AR(1) process is
straightforward from the above formula: Once the process parameters (a,b)  have been
estimated, the variance of a risk factor for any desired time horizon can be derived and
thus the Monte Carlo simulation just has to generate normally distributed random
numbers with this desired variance.
10
                                               
10 Alternatively, the simulation could generate future paths of risk factors using the regression formula and a series
of i.i.d. innovations.First Draft
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Although the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is used in many interest rate option pricing
models
11, a higher order process (AR(n) process) fits the empirical data generally better.
Thus one should use higher order AR processes as long as they can easily be handled.
This is (fortunately) the case for Monte Carlo simulations but is not the case in the area
of option pricing theory.
When additional lags are used in the AR process, resulting in a higher order process.
Consider for example the AR(4) process:
S S S S S t t t t t t = + + + + + - - - - a b b b b e 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
Using the Lag operator (defined as L S S
k
t t k = - ), this equation can be expressed as:
e b t t i
i
i
S L = -
￿
Ł
￿
￿
ł
￿
= ￿ 1
1
4
In order to derive the n step ahead variance of the process, we have to invoke the Wold
decomposition theorem, according to which the process can be expressed as an infinite
moving average process of white noise innovation e, such that
12
St t t t = + + + - - e y e y e 1 1 2 3 ....
Again using the Lag operator, this equation becomes
S L t j
j
t
j
= +
=
¥
￿ ( ) 1
1
y e
Inserting the above expression for et into this equation and multiplying out, we receive:
1 1 1
1
4
1
= + -
￿
Ł
￿
￿
ł
￿
= =
¥
￿ ￿ ( ) y b j
j
i
i
i j
L L
From this formula, we can see that the y - weights can be analytically derived from the
recursion
y b y j k j k
k
j
= -
= ￿
1
4 min( , )
 and y 0 0 =
                                               
11 For overviews over the vast literature, see Hull (1993) and Jarrow (1996).
12 See Hamilton (1994), p. 108-109.First Draft
17
Given the values for the y - weights, we can express en, the error of a forecast n steps
ahead, and its variance (assuming i.i.d.) as
( )
en t n t n n
e n
= + + +
= + + +
+ + - -
-
e y e y e
s s y y e
1 1 1
2 2
1
2
1
2 1
...
...
Thus we have a closed form solution for the variance and can simulate future scenarios
with the same approach as for the AR(1) process.
4.8  VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE PROCESSES
A clear remaining weakness of autoregressive processes is that they model only the time
dependent nature of volatility but not of correlations. However, there are no reasons to
believe that only volatility and not correlation may depend on the time horizon. For
example consider the of the DEM/USD and the FRF/USD exchange rate. Over the short
run, the European Monetary System (EMS) has only a minor effect on returns and the
correlation between DM and FRF rate may be relatively low. Over time horizons of
many years however, the correlation must be close to one (as long as the EMS does not
crash) because the EMS ties both rates tightly together.
An extension to autoregressive processes that is capable of modelling the time dependent
nature of both volatility and correlation are Vector Autoregressive Processes (VAR’s).
Without going into technical details here, a VAR can be viewed as the multivariate
extension of autoregressive processes. These processes allow not only the derivation of
time dependent volatilities but instead deliver a complete covariance matrix for different
time horizons.
In order to model the covariance structure of a multivariate process explicitly, the AR
process can be extended in a straightforward way to a multivariate setting. If St denotes
the vector of risk factor values at time t we can define a VAR process equivalent to an
AR process as:
S S S u
t t t t = + + + +
- - A B B
1 1 2 2 ...
If there are n factors, then A is (1·n) vector of intercept terms, Bi are (n·n) matrices of
regression parameters and ut is a (1·n) vector of random disturbances. The coefficientsFirst Draft
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in A,Bi can be estimated by multivariate least squares, which can equivalently be
performed through equation by equation ordinary least squares regressions.
13
The derivation of the forecast error variance vector is analogous to the univariate case,
except that the weights of the infinite moving average representation, yi is now an (n·n)
matrix as well. Denoting the covariance matrix of the error terms by Su, we arrive at an
expression for the covariance matrix of the n step ahead forecast error as
s y y e i u i
i
n
2
0
1
= ¢
=
-
￿ S
4.9  COMBINATION OF VAR PROCESSES WITH REGRESSION ANALYTICS
A last possible extension of VAR processes is their combination with regression analytics.
In many cases, the use of regression analytics is simply dictated by the unavailability of
historical time series necessary to estimate the parameters of the stochastic process.
Consider for example a portfolio of OTC derivatives on single stocks. A simulation of
future price paths requires historical data on every single stock that serves as an
underlying for a derivative transaction. In the case of a newly issued stock, one has to
revert to the market model in order to derive stock price scenarios. The market model
assumes a linear regression dependency between the return of the stock in question and
some market index. Price paths for the stock can then be derived from simulated price
paths of the market index.
In the case of interest rates, an inclusion of many different points from the yield curve as
opens the possibility of generating „unreasonable“ scenarios. In principle one could
include an arbitrary number of points from a yield curve to generate scenarios with the
VAR process. Every future scenario will be distributed according to a multivariate normal
distribution as specified by the covariance matrix implied by the VAR. However, when
one uses a lot of factors some of the generated scenarios will not be consistent with the
most basic no arbitrage condition of the yield curve: all implied forward rates must be
non negative. (Negative implied forward rates imply an arbitrage opportunity by selling
and buying zero bonds with different maturities). The reason for this nasty result is the
                                               
13 See Lütkepohl (1991).First Draft
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fact that interest rates in reality cannot be multivariate normally distributed: for example,
a multivariate normal distribution assigns some positive probability to every possible
future combination of the 1 year and the 2 year zero rate. However, some of these
combinations violate the no arbitrage condition and therefore cannot occur in practice.
The possibility generating unrealistic interest rate scenarios poses a dilemma: On the one
hand, multivariate normal distributions are the only feasible alternative to generate
scenarios with a large number of correlated risk factors; on the other hand, if many
points of a yield curve are simulated using a multivariate normal distribution, scenarios
violating the no arbitrage condition are likely to occur.
A pragmatic way out of this dilemma is the combination of VAR processes with
regression analysis.
14 In this approach, only a small number of yield curve points are
simulated with the VAR process while the likely values of the remaining points are
derived from a regression of the remaining rates on the simulated rates. The regression
thus gives the most likely value of the remaining points given the value of the rates
simulated using the  VAR process. (Note, that this shortcoming is by no means special to
VARs, the same problem arises for every time series model which is based on multivariate
normality.)
Of course, even the use of regression analysis does not guarantee that inconsistent yield
curves do not occur. For example, an extremely high simulated short rate in combination
with an extremely low long rage still could violate the no arbitrage condition. However,
this event is unlikely to happen in reality.
4.10  ARBITRAGE FREE TERM STRUCTURE MODELS
All stochastic processes described so far  are rooted in the time series analysis tradition
founded by Granger and Newbold.
15 Another family of stochastic time series models are
the no arbitrage models of the term structure used in interest rate option pricing.
16 These
                                               
14 Another alternative is the use of multi-factor arbitrage free yield curve models which however have other
shortcomings and are not further discussed here.
15 Granger and Newbold (1977).
16 See Jarrow (1996).First Draft
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models have the feature that dynamic trading strategies cannot generate an arbitrage
profit, given that the model is correct. This restriction is not used in the time series
models discussed so far and thus represent an argument in favour of no arbitrage models.
However, no arbitrage models of the term structure are notoriously hard to calibrate, if
they include many risk factors. If one restricts the number of risk factors, then the model
can only produce a rather limited amount of futures yield curve shapes which seems
inconsistent with the empirical observations.
In respect to measuring counterparty exposure, there exists one other limitation which
effectively prevent their use for this task: no arbitrage term structure models are partial
models of one single yield curve. In order to measure the future potential exposure, a
bank has to estimate possible paths for a large variety of different market rates, such as
different yield curves, exchange rates, equity prices and implied volatility. The restriction
of no arbitrage models to one yield curve thus make it impossible to use them as a
general modelling tool for large derivatives portfolios.
5  CHOICE OF RISK FACTORS AND VALUATION TECHNIQUES
5.1  RISK FACTOR CHOICE
In order to estimate counterparty exposure, the value of the counterparty portfolio must
be derived for every simulated market rate scenario. Since every simulation must
necessarily be restricted to a set of market rates for which historical time series are
available, the simulation will never include all market rates which define exposure. For
example, it is generally not possible to estimate the stochastic process of all existing
exchange rates, equity prices, interest rates etc. The level of accuracy then depends on
the ability of the system to include all important drivers of exposure. For example, if only
one interest rate factor is used for a yield curve, the system can only simulate parallel
shifts of the yield curve. Portfolios, whose value depend mainly on the steepness or
curvature of the yield curve, will then falsely show little exposure.
In a similar way, the implied volatility risk of options can only be modelled accurately, if
enough implied volatilities are used as independent risk factors. If the model assumes aFirst Draft
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parallel shift of all implied volatilities, a portfolio which consist of short and long options
may not show any implied volatility risk although the implied volatilities are not perfectly
correlated.
However, it is also possible to include too many risk factors in the simulation. Consider
as an easy example a portfolio of options with some options on the DEM/$ exchange
rate and others on the $/DEM exchange rate. If both rates are modelled as independent
risk factors, the simulation will generate incompatible scenarios, because both factors are
functionally dependant. Analogously, cross rates must be handled with care: if the
DEM/$ rate and the DEM/FRF rate serve as risk factors, the $/FRF rate must not be
included as another risk factor.
5.2  VALUATION OF TRANSACTIONS
Exposure simulations are very computation time intensive because they generally require
a full repricing of every transaction for every simulated market scenario. The use of
Taylor Series approximations is often not appropriate, because the simulated market rate
changes over long time horizons are often large and introduce a significant error term.
Thus, it may not even be appropriate to calculate the value of „linear“ instruments such
as swaps by using a duration based pricing approximation or the so called Delta-Gamma-
approach (a second order Taylor Series approximation).
For some transactions, special problems arise. For example, the futures value of an
interest rate swap depends on the futures fixing rates.  Because of computation time
constraints, the simulation is usually conducted only for discrete points of time. When the
fixing date falls in between to simulation time points, the fixing rate must be „guessed“.
A natural guess would be to use the rate generated by the simulation. However, this
approach effectively sets the exposure of the floating leg for plain vanilla swaps to zero,
because the value of the floating leg will by definition always be the notional value.
Another difficult area is the calculation of counterparty exposure for swaptions after their
maturity. If the swaption holder exercises his swaption in the future, the swaption will be
converted into a swap and generate additional exposure. However, most swaptions are
cash settled such that  exposure vanishes after swaption maturity. Every simulation ofFirst Draft
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counterparty exposure including swaptions must therefore make an assumption whether
to assume future exercises or not.
6  CONCLUSION
The analysis of the exposure measurement problem has shown that the proper
measurement of counterparty exposure for portfolios of derivatives transactions is a
complex task that cannot be performed without making a lot of simplifying assumptions.
Because of  the complicated interaction of correlation effects and offsettings from
different transactions, the single transaction framework which is currently used by most
banks is definitely not capable of accurately determining the portfolio credit risk.
When simulation techniques are applied to estimate exposure, the accuracy of exposure
estimations can be increased significantly. However, a lot of modelling choices has to be
made concerning the valuation of transactions and the stochastic model of underlying
market rates. Because the system has to make projections of market rates into the far
future, the choice of an appropriate stochastic model for market rate dynamics is crucial
in order to prevent unreasonable scenarios. The predominant application of models based
on Brownian Motion in today’s bank risk management therefore leads to questionable
results in respect to derivatives exposure evaluation.First Draft
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